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Merge #17164: p2p: Avoid allocating memory for addrKnown where we don't need it
b6d2183858
Minor refactoring to remove implied m_addr_relay_peer. (User)a552e8477c
added asserts to check m_addr_known when it's used (User)090b75c14b
p2p: Avoid allocating memory for addrKnown where we don't need it (User) Pull request description: We should allocate memory for addrKnown filter only for those peers which are expected to participate in address relay. Currently, we do it for all peers (including SPV and block-relay-only), which results in extra RAM where it's not needed. Upd: In future, we would still allow SPVs to ask for addrs, so allocation still will be done by default. However, they will be able to opt-out via [this proposal](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-October/017428.html) and then we could save some more memory. This PR still saves memory for block-relay-only peers immediately after merging. Top commit has no ACKs. Tree-SHA512: e84d93b2615556d466f5ca0e543580fde763911a3bfea3127c493ddfaba8f05c8605cb94ff795d165af542b594400995a2c51338185c298581408687e7812463
This commit is contained in:
commit
8f9df2ed88
4 changed files with 11 additions and 13 deletions
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@ -115,9 +115,6 @@ public:
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class CRollingBloomFilter
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{
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public:
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// A random bloom filter calls GetRand() at creation time.
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// Don't create global CRollingBloomFilter objects, as they may be
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// constructed before the randomizer is properly initialized.
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CRollingBloomFilter(const unsigned int nElements, const double nFPRate);
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void insert(const std::vector<unsigned char>& vKey);
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@ -2666,11 +2666,10 @@ CNode::CNode(NodeId idIn, ServiceFlags nLocalServicesIn, int nMyStartingHeightIn
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addrBind(addrBindIn),
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fInbound(fInboundIn),
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nKeyedNetGroup(nKeyedNetGroupIn),
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addrKnown(5000, 0.001),
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// Don't relay addr messages to peers that we connect to as block-relay-only
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// peers (to prevent adversaries from inferring these links from addr
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// traffic).
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m_addr_relay_peer(!block_relay_only),
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m_addr_known{block_relay_only ? nullptr : MakeUnique<CRollingBloomFilter>(5000, 0.001)},
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id(idIn),
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nLocalHostNonce(nLocalHostNonceIn),
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nLocalServices(nLocalServicesIn),
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11
src/net.h
11
src/net.h
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@ -776,13 +776,12 @@ public:
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// flood relay
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std::vector<CAddress> vAddrToSend;
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CRollingBloomFilter addrKnown;
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const std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> m_addr_known;
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bool fGetAddr{false};
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int64_t nNextAddrSend GUARDED_BY(cs_sendProcessing){0};
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int64_t nNextLocalAddrSend GUARDED_BY(cs_sendProcessing){0};
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const bool m_addr_relay_peer;
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bool IsAddrRelayPeer() const { return m_addr_relay_peer; }
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bool IsAddrRelayPeer() const { return m_addr_known != nullptr; }
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// List of block ids we still have announce.
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// There is no final sorting before sending, as they are always sent immediately
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@ -931,7 +930,8 @@ public:
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void AddAddressKnown(const CAddress& _addr)
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{
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addrKnown.insert(_addr.GetKey());
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assert(m_addr_known);
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m_addr_known->insert(_addr.GetKey());
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}
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void PushAddress(const CAddress& _addr, FastRandomContext &insecure_rand)
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@ -939,7 +939,8 @@ public:
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// Known checking here is only to save space from duplicates.
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// SendMessages will filter it again for knowns that were added
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// after addresses were pushed.
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if (_addr.IsValid() && !addrKnown.contains(_addr.GetKey())) {
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assert(m_addr_known);
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if (_addr.IsValid() && !m_addr_known->contains(_addr.GetKey())) {
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if (vAddrToSend.size() >= MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND) {
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vAddrToSend[insecure_rand.randrange(vAddrToSend.size())] = _addr;
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} else {
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@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ static void RelayAddress(const CAddress& addr, bool fReachable, CConnman* connma
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// Relay to a limited number of other nodes
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// Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours
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// at a time so the addrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
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// at a time so the m_addr_knowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
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uint64_t hashAddr = addr.GetHash();
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const CSipHasher hasher = connman->GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY).Write(hashAddr << 32).Write((GetTime() + hashAddr) / (24*60*60));
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FastRandomContext insecure_rand;
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@ -3587,11 +3587,12 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
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pto->nNextAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
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std::vector<CAddress> vAddr;
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vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size());
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assert(pto->m_addr_known);
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for (const CAddress& addr : pto->vAddrToSend)
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{
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if (!pto->addrKnown.contains(addr.GetKey()))
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if (!pto->m_addr_known->contains(addr.GetKey()))
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{
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pto->addrKnown.insert(addr.GetKey());
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pto->m_addr_known->insert(addr.GetKey());
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vAddr.push_back(addr);
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// receiver rejects addr messages larger than 1000
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if (vAddr.size() >= 1000)
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