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Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#15545: [doc] explain why CheckBlock() is called before AcceptBlock

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3d552b0d78 [doc] explain why CheckBlock() is called before AcceptBlock() (Sjors Provoost)

Pull request description:

  Based on https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-February/016697.html and its PDF attachment.

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  MarcoFalke:
    cr ACK 3d552b0d78

Tree-SHA512: d1ef39855317853e0e7e051ec6015054d0d227fcdf20281c2c1921056537f1f79044aa1bdd35f46475edd17596fbcae79aeb338c4865b1269a01b158f6cb2ac4
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MarcoFalke 2021-06-04 09:50:51 +02:00
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1 changed files with 5 additions and 2 deletions
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7
src/validation.cpp
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@ -3605,8 +3605,11 @@ bool ChainstateManager::ProcessNewBlock(const CChainParams& chainparams, const s
// Therefore, the following critical section must include the CheckBlock() call as well.
LOCK(cs_main);
// Ensure that CheckBlock() passes before calling AcceptBlock, as
// belt-and-suspenders.
// Skipping AcceptBlock() for CheckBlock() failures means that we will never mark a block as invalid if
// CheckBlock() fails. This is protective against consensus failure if there are any unknown forms of block
// malleability that cause CheckBlock() to fail; see e.g. CVE-2012-2459 and
// https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-February/016697.html. Because CheckBlock() is
// not very expensive, the anti-DoS benefits of caching failure (of a definitely-invalid block) are not substantial.
bool ret = CheckBlock(*block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus());
if (ret) {
// Store to disk