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random: Remove remaining OpenSSL calls and locking infrastructure

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fanquake 2019-10-26 08:41:58 -04:00
parent 4fcfcc294e
commit b49b6b0f70
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1 changed files with 0 additions and 35 deletions
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35
src/random.cpp
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@ -43,10 +43,6 @@
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
[[noreturn]] static void RandFailure()
{
LogPrintf("Failed to read randomness, aborting\n");
@ -347,8 +343,6 @@ void GetOSRand(unsigned char *ent32)
#endif
}
void LockingCallbackOpenSSL(int mode, int i, const char* file, int line);
namespace {
class RNGState {
@ -364,31 +358,15 @@ class RNGState {
unsigned char m_state[32] GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = {0};
uint64_t m_counter GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = 0;
bool m_strongly_seeded GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = false;
std::unique_ptr<Mutex[]> m_mutex_openssl;
public:
RNGState() noexcept
{
InitHardwareRand();
// Init OpenSSL library multithreading support
m_mutex_openssl.reset(new Mutex[CRYPTO_num_locks()]);
CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(LockingCallbackOpenSSL);
// OpenSSL can optionally load a config file which lists optional loadable modules and engines.
// We don't use them so we don't require the config. However some of our libs may call functions
// which attempt to load the config file, possibly resulting in an exit() or crash if it is missing
// or corrupt. Explicitly tell OpenSSL not to try to load the file. The result for our libs will be
// that the config appears to have been loaded and there are no modules/engines available.
OPENSSL_no_config();
}
~RNGState()
{
// Securely erase the memory used by the OpenSSL PRNG
RAND_cleanup();
// Shutdown OpenSSL library multithreading support
CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(nullptr);
}
/** Extract up to 32 bytes of entropy from the RNG state, mixing in new entropy from hasher.
@ -424,8 +402,6 @@ public:
memory_cleanse(buf, 64);
return ret;
}
Mutex& GetOpenSSLMutex(int i) { return m_mutex_openssl[i]; }
};
RNGState& GetRNGState() noexcept
@ -437,17 +413,6 @@ RNGState& GetRNGState() noexcept
}
}
void LockingCallbackOpenSSL(int mode, int i, const char* file, int line) NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS
{
RNGState& rng = GetRNGState();
if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
rng.GetOpenSSLMutex(i).lock();
} else {
rng.GetOpenSSLMutex(i).unlock();
}
}
/* A note on the use of noexcept in the seeding functions below:
*
* None of the RNG code should ever throw any exception, with the sole exception