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[refactor] Remove IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate

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This commit is contained in:
Amiti Uttarwar 2020-07-21 16:28:47 -07:00
parent 2f2e13b6c2
commit bc5d65b3ca
1 changed files with 4 additions and 9 deletions
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13
src/net_processing.cpp
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@ -827,11 +827,6 @@ void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(NodeId node, int64_t time_in_seconds)
if (state) state->m_last_block_announcement = time_in_seconds;
}
static bool IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(const CNode& node)
{
return node.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn();
}
void PeerLogicValidation::InitializeNode(CNode *pnode) {
CAddress addr = pnode->addr;
std::string addrName = pnode->GetAddrName();
@ -1963,14 +1958,14 @@ static void ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode& pfrom, CConnman& connman, ChainstateMan
// until we have a headers chain that has at least
// nMinimumChainWork, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
// as an anti-DoS measure.
if (IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom)) {
if (pfrom.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn()) {
LogPrintf("Disconnecting outbound peer %d -- headers chain has insufficient work\n", pfrom.GetId());
pfrom.fDisconnect = true;
}
}
}
if (!pfrom.fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && pfrom.m_tx_relay != nullptr) {
if (!pfrom.fDisconnect && pfrom.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn() && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && pfrom.m_tx_relay != nullptr) {
// If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect
// it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
// Note that block-relay-only peers are already implicitly protected, so we
@ -3854,7 +3849,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::ConsiderEviction(CNode& pto, int64_t time_in_seconds)
CNodeState &state = *State(pto.GetId());
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pto.GetSendVersion());
if (!state.m_chain_sync.m_protect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pto) && state.fSyncStarted) {
if (!state.m_chain_sync.m_protect && pto.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn() && state.fSyncStarted) {
// This is an outbound peer subject to disconnection if they don't
// announce a block with as much work as the current tip within
// CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds (note: if
@ -3916,7 +3911,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::EvictExtraOutboundPeers(int64_t time_in_seconds)
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
// Ignore non-outbound peers, or nodes marked for disconnect already
if (!IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(*pnode) || pnode->fDisconnect) return;
if (!pnode->IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn() || pnode->fDisconnect) return;
CNodeState *state = State(pnode->GetId());
if (state == nullptr) return; // shouldn't be possible, but just in case
// Don't evict our protected peers