fa33ed4b3f fuzz: Limit max ops in tx_pool fuzz targets (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Without a size limit on the input data, the runtime is unbounded. Fix this by picking an upper bound on the maximum number of fuzz operations.
Reproducer from OSS-Fuzz (without bug report):
[clusterfuzz-testcase-tx_pool_standard-5963992253202432.log](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/files/6822465/clusterfuzz-testcase-tx_pool_standard-5963992253202432.log)
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
cr ACK fa33ed4b3f
Tree-SHA512: 32098d573880afba12d510ac83519dc886a6c65d5207edb810f92c7c61edf5e2fc9c57e7b7a1ae656c02ce14e3595707dd6b93caf7956beb2bc817609e14d23d
faa86b71ac fuzz: Use ConsumeUInt256 helper to simplify rolling_bloom_filter fuzz test (MarcoFalke)
aaaa61fd30 fuzz: Speed up rolling_bloom_filter fuzz test (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Without a size limit on the input data, the runtime is unbounded. Fix this by picking an upper bound on the maximum number of fuzz operations.
Reproducer from OSS-Fuzz (without bug report):
[clusterfuzz-testcase-rolling_bloom_filter-5980807721254912.log](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/files/6822159/clusterfuzz-testcase-rolling_bloom_filter-5980807721254912.log)
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
cr ACK faa86b71ac
theStack:
Concept and code review ACK faa86b71ac
Tree-SHA512: eace588509dfddb2ba97baf86379fa713fa6eb758184abff676cb95807ff8ff36905eeaddeba05665b8464c35c57e2138f88caec71cbfb255e546bbe76558da0
faafda232e fuzz: Speed up prevector fuzz target (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Without a size limit on the input data, the runtime is unbounded. Fix this by picking an upper bound on the maximum number of fuzz operations.
Should fix https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=35981
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
cr ACK faafda232e
Tree-SHA512: 1bf166c4a99a8ce88bdc030cd6a32ce1da5251b73873772e0e9c001ec2bacafebb183f7c8c88806d0ab633aada2cff8b78791f5c9c0c6f2cc8ef5f0875c4b2ef
fa8bed6a47 fuzz: Temporarily disable failing assert in banman fuzz test (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Otherwise the remainder of the fuzz test can't be fuzzed without running into crashes
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
cr ACK fa8bed6a47
Tree-SHA512: ec6606292e2cfd26484c7f6caf1c418c377da54111b332990fce68373f0438defda71d931a42ca34431527fbc172dd2fdf29b260afca15b34910ee137de1c365
aaaa9c6019 fuzz: Extend addrman fuzz test with deserialize (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Requested on IRC:
```
[18:01] <vasild> => I think there is a good chance fuzzing addrman unserialize will find more bugs
[18:04] <sipa> definitely
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
ACK aaaa9c6019 per `git diff fa74025 aaaa9c6`
vasild:
ACK aaaa9c6019
Tree-SHA512: f57d0aecf22a933e48d3181d7398218949588dd0de31218d1d28c825649e55fd60b0de6fbc92d2497cf5639a4adc2061c9bf8216546a2be916feac4f03f16e8f
f036dfbb69 [addrman] Remove unused test_before_evict argument from Good() (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
This has never been used in the public interface method since it was
introduced in #9037.
ACKs for top commit:
lsilva01:
Tested ACK f036dfbb69 on Ubuntu 20.04.
theStack:
Code-review ACK f036dfbb69
Tree-SHA512: 98145d9596b4ae1f354cfa561be1a54c6b8057c920e0ac3d4c1d42c9326b2dad2d44320f4171bb701d97088b216760cca8017b84c8b5dcd2b1dc8f158f28066d
fa621ededd refactor: Pass script verify flags as uint32_t (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
The flags are cast to unsigned in the interpreter anyway, so avoid the confusion (and fuzz crashes) by just passing them as unsigned from the beginning.
Also, the flags are often inverted bit-wise with the `~` operator, which also works on signed integers, but might cause confusion as the sign bit is flipped.
Fixes #22233
ACKs for top commit:
theStack:
Concept and code review ACK fa621ededd
kristapsk:
ACK fa621ededd
jonatack:
ACK fa621ededd
Tree-SHA512: ea0720f32f823fa7f075309978672aa39773c6019d12b6c1c9d611fc1983a76115b7fe2a28d50814673bb6415c311ccc05b99d6e871575fb6900faf75ed17769
facd56750c scripted-diff: Revert "fuzz: Add Temporary debug assert for oss-fuzz issue" (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
No longer needed, as it wouldn't help to debug this issue. See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/22472#issuecomment-882692900
ACKs for top commit:
fanquake:
ACK facd56750c
Tree-SHA512: 13352b3529c43d6e65ab127134b32158d3072dc2fbbb326fea9adfeada5a8610d0477ea75748b8b68e7abb3b9869a989df3a3169e92bdd458053d64bae6ed379
Moved implementations of `ConsumeTxMemPoolEntry`, `ContainsSpentInput`, `ConsumeNetAddr`, and the methods(open, read, write, seek, close) of FuzzedFileProvider from test/fuzz/util.h to test/fuzz/util.cpp.
00b875ba94 addrman: remove invalid addresses when unserializing (Vasil Dimov)
bdb62096f0 fuzz: reduce possible networks check (Vasil Dimov)
a164cd3ba6 net: simplify CNetAddr::IsRoutable() (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
* Simplify some code, now that we know `CNetAddr::IsRFC4193()` and `CNetAddr::IsTor()` cannot be `true` at the same time.
* Drop Tor v2 addresses when loading addrman from `peers.dat` - they would have been loaded as dummy-all-zeros IPv6 addresses and linger in addrman, wasting space.
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
ACK 00b875ba94. Reviewed the code, and tested with -DDEBUG_ADDRMAN (unit tests + mainnet run with peers.dat that contained v2 onions).
laanwj:
Code review and lightly tested ACK 00b875ba94
jonatack:
ACK 00b875ba94 reviewed, debug-built with -DEBUG_ADDRMAN rebased to current master, restarted node on mainnet/signet/testnet and verified that on each chain -addrinfo shows no change in address counts (as expected). Added some sanity check asserts, rebuilt/re-ran test. Checked that the new test fails on master with "test/addrman_tests.cpp(824): error: in "addrman_tests/remove_invalid": check addrman.size() == 2 has failed [4 != 2]"
jarolrod:
ACK 00b875ba94
Tree-SHA512: 6ed8e6745134b1b94fffaba28482de909ea39483b46b7f57bda61cdbae7a51251d15cb674de3631772fbeabe153d77a19269f96e62a89102a2d5c01e48f0ba06
* Assert when a type is missing
* Add missing WitnessV1Taproot
* Limit WitnessUnknown to version [2, 16], to avoid abiguity
* Limit WitnessUnknown to size [2, 40], to avoid invalid sizes
fa0d9211ef refactor: Remove chainparams arg from CChainState member functions (MarcoFalke)
fa38947125 refactor: Remove ::Params() global from inside CChainState member functions (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
The `::Params()` global is verbose and confusing. Also it makes tests a bit harder to write because they'd have to mock a global.
Fix all issues by simply using a member variable that points to the right params.
(Can be reviewed with `--word-diff-regex=.`)
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
ACK fa0d9211ef
kiminuo:
utACK fa0d9211
theStack:
ACK fa0d9211ef🍉
Tree-SHA512: 44676b19c9ed471ccb536331d3029bad192d7d50f394fd7b8527ec431452aeec8c4494164b9cf8e16e0123c4463b16be864366c6b599370032c17262625a0356
7ad414f4bf doc: add comment about CCoinsViewDBCursor constructor (James O'Beirne)
0f8a5a4dd5 move-only(ish): don't expose CCoinsViewDBCursor (James O'Beirne)
615c1adfb0 refactor: wrap CCoinsViewCursor in unique_ptr (James O'Beirne)
Pull request description:
I tripped over this one for a few hours at the beginning of the week, so I've sort of got a personal vendetta against `CCoinsView::Cursor()` returning a raw pointer.
Specifically in the case of CCoinsViewDB, if a raw cursor is allocated and not freed, a cryptic leveldb assertion failure occurs on CCoinsViewDB destruction (`Assertion 'dummy_versions_.next_ == &dummy_versions_' failed.`).
This is a pretty simple change.
Related to: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/21766
See also: https://github.com/google/leveldb/issues/142#issuecomment-414418135
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 7ad414f4bf🔎
jonatack:
re-ACK 7ad414f4bf modulo suggestion
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 7ad414f4bf. Two new commits look good and thanks for clarifying constructor comment
Tree-SHA512: 6471d03e2de674d84b1ea0d31e25f433d52aa1aa4996f7b4aab1bd02b6bc340b15e64cc8ea07bbefefa3b5da35384ca5400cc230434e787c30931b8574c672f9
Save the banlist in `banlist.json` instead of `banlist.dat`.
This makes it possible to store Tor v3 entries in the banlist on disk
(and any other addresses that cannot be serialized in addrv1 format).
Only read `banlist.dat` if it exists and `banlist.json` does not
exist (first start after an upgrade).
Supersedes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20904
Resolves https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/19748
9550dffa0c fuzz: Assert roundtrip equality for `CPubKey` (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
This PR is a (quite late) follow-up to #19237 (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19237#issuecomment-642203251). Looking at `CPubKey::Serialize` and `CPubKey::Unserialize` I can't think of a scenario where the roundtrip (serialization/deserialization) equality wouldn't hold.
ACKs for top commit:
jamesob:
crACK 9550dffa0c pending CI
Tree-SHA512: 640fb9e777d249769b22ee52c0b15a68ff0645b16c986e1c0bce9742155d14f1be601e591833e1dc8dcffebf271966c6b861b90888a44aae1feae2e0248e2c55
f8866e8c32 Add roundtrip fuzz tests for CAddress serialization (Pieter Wuille)
e2f0548b52 Use addrv2 serialization in anchors.dat (Pieter Wuille)
8cd8f37dfe Introduce well-defined CAddress disk serialization (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Alternative to #20509.
This makes the `CAddress` disk serialization format well defined, and uses it to enable addrv2 support in anchors.dat (in a way that's compatible with older software). The new format is:
- The first 4 bytes store a format version number. Its low 19 bits are ignored (as those historically stored the `CLIENT_VERSION`), but its high 13 bits specify the actual serialization:
- 0x00000000: LE64 encoding for `nServices`, V1 encoding for `CService` (like pre-BIP155 network serialization).
- 0x20000000: CompactSize encoding for `nServices`, V2 encoding for `CService` (like BIP155 network serialization).
- Any other value triggers an unsupported format error on deserialization, and can be used for future format changes.
- The `ADDRV2_FORMAT` flag in the stream's version does not determine the actual serialization format; it only sets whether or not V2 encoding is permitted.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK f8866e8c32
laanwj:
Code review ACK f8866e8c32
vasild:
ACK f8866e8c32
jonatack:
ACK f8866e8c32 tested rebased to master and built/run/restarted with DEBUG_ADDRMAN, peers.dat and anchors ser/deser seems fine
hebasto:
ACK f8866e8c32, tested on Linux Mint 20.1 (x86_64).
Tree-SHA512: 3898f8a8c51783a46dd0aae03fa10060521f5dd6e79315fe95ba807689e78f202388ffa28c40bf156c6f7b1fc2ce806b155dcbe56027df73d039a55331723796
faf1af58f8 fuzz: Add Temporary debug assert for oss-fuzz issue (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
oss-fuzz is acting weird, so add an earlier assert to help troubleshooting
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
cr ACK faf1af58f8
Tree-SHA512: 85830d7d47cf6b4edfe91a07bd5aa8f7110db0bade8df93868cf276ed04d5dd17e671f769e6a0fb5092012b86aa82bb411fb171411f15746981104ce634c88c1
1b1088d52f test: add combined I2P/onion/localhost eviction protection tests (Jon Atack)
7c2284eda2 test: add tests for inbound eviction protection of I2P peers (Jon Atack)
ce02dd1ef1 p2p: extend inbound eviction protection by network to I2P peers (Jon Atack)
70bbc62711 test: add combined onion/localhost eviction protection coverage (Jon Atack)
045cb40192 p2p: remove unused m_is_onion member from NodeEvictionCandidate struct (Jon Atack)
310fab4928 p2p: remove unused CompareLocalHostTimeConnected() (Jon Atack)
9e889e8a5c p2p: remove unused CompareOnionTimeConnected() (Jon Atack)
787d46bb2a p2p: update ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() doxygen docs (Jon Atack)
1e15acf478 p2p: make ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() fully ratio-based (Jon Atack)
3f8105c4d2 test: remove combined onion/localhost eviction protection tests (Jon Atack)
38a81a8e20 p2p: add CompareNodeNetworkTime() comparator struct (Jon Atack)
4ee7aec47e p2p: add m_network to NodeEvictionCandidate struct (Jon Atack)
7321e6f2fe p2p, refactor: rename vEvictionCandidates to eviction_candidates (Jon Atack)
ec590f1d91 p2p, refactor: improve constness in ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() (Jon Atack)
4a19f501ab test: add ALL_NETWORKS to test utilities (Jon Atack)
519e76bb64 test: speed up and simplify peer_eviction_test (Jon Atack)
1cde800523 p2p, refactor: rm redundant erase_size calculation in SelectNodeToEvict() (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
Continuing the work in #20197 and #20685, this pull updates and abstracts our inbound eviction protection to make it fully ratio-based and easily extensible to peers connected via high-latency privacy networks that we newly support, like I2P and perhaps others soon, as these peers are disadvantaged by the latency criteria of our eviction logic.
It then adds eviction protection for peers connected over I2P. As described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20685#issuecomment-767486499, we've observed over the past few months that I2P peers have a min ping latency similar to or greater than that of onion peers.
The algorithm is a basically a multi-pass knapsack:
- Count the number of eviction candidates in each of the disadvantaged
privacy networks.
- Sort the networks from lower to higher candidate counts, so that
a network with fewer candidates will have the first opportunity
for any unused slots remaining from the previous iteration. In
the case of a tie in candidate counts, priority is given by array
member order from first to last, guesstimated to favor more unusual
networks.
- Iterate through the networks in this order. On each iteration,
allocate each network an equal number of protected slots targeting
a total number of candidates to protect, provided any slots remain
in the knapsack.
- Protect the candidates in that network having the longest uptime,
if any in that network are present.
- Continue iterating as long as we have non-allocated slots
remaining and candidates available to protect.
The goal of this logic is to favorise the diversity of our peer connections.
The individual commit messages describe each change in more detail.
Special thank you to Vasil Dimov for the excellent review feedback and the algorithm improvement that made this change much better than it would have been otherwise. Thanks also to Antoine Riard, whose review feedback nudged this change to protect disadvantaged networks having fewer, rather than more, eviction candidates.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review re-ACK 1b1088d52f
vasild:
ACK 1b1088d52f
Tree-SHA512: 722f790ff11f2969c79e45a5e0e938d94df78df8687e77002f32e3ef5c72a9ac10ebf8c7a9eb7f71882c97ab0e67b2778191effdb747d9ca54d7c23c2ed19a90
The return type is already enforced to be void by the
ternary operator:
./test/fuzz/util.h:47:25: error: right operand to ? is void, but left operand is of type *OTHER_TYPE*
((i++ == call_index ? callables() : void()), ...);
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~
3737d35fee fuzz: Terminate immediately if a fuzzing harness ever tries to perform a DNS lookup (belts and suspenders) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Terminate immediately if a fuzzing harness tries to perform a DNS lookup (belt and suspenders).
Obviously this _should_ never happen, but if it _does_ happen we want immediate termination instead of a DNS lookup :)
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 3737d35fee
Tree-SHA512: 51cd2d32def7f9f052e02f99c354656af1f807cc9fdf592ab765e620bfe660f1ed26e0484763f94aba650424b44959eafaf352bfd0f81aa273e350510e97356e
