15796d4b61 build: warn on self-assignment (Cory Fields)
53372f2176 refactor: disable self-assign warning for tests (Cory Fields)
Pull request description:
Belt-and suspenders after #30234. Self-assignment should be safe _and_ discouraged.
We used to opt out of this warning because something deep in our serialization/byteswapping code could self-assign, but that doesn't appear to be the case anymore.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
ACK 15796d4b61
fanquake:
ACK 15796d4b61 - not a huge fan of inline pragma usage, but this seems fine, given it's to work around an already-fixed compiler bug, and we'll only be carrying it for a shortish time in any case.
Tree-SHA512: 1f95f7c730b974ad1da55ebd381040bac312f2f380fff9d569ebab91d7c1963592a84d1613d81d96238c6f5a66aa40deebba68a76f6b24b02150d0a77c769654
30a01134cd [doc] update bips.md for 431 (glozow)
9dbe6a03f0 [test] wallet uses CURRENT_VERSION which is 2 (glozow)
539404fe0f [policy] make v3 transactions standard (glozow)
052ede75af [refactor] use TRUC_VERSION in place of 3 (glozow)
Pull request description:
Make `nVersion=3` (which is currently nonstandard on mainnet) standard.
Note that we will treat these transactions as Topologically Restricted Until Confirmation (TRUC). Spec is in BIP 431 and implementation is in #28948, #29306, and #29873
See #27463 for overall project tracking, and #29319 for information about relevance to cluster mempool.
ACKs for top commit:
sdaftuar:
utACK 30a01134c
achow101:
ACK 30a01134cd
instagibbs:
utACK 30a01134cd
murchandamus:
ACK 30a01134cd
ismaelsadeeq:
ACK 30a01134cd🛰️
Tree-SHA512: 2a4aec0442c860e792a061d83e36483c1f1b426f946efbdf664c8db97a596e498b535707e1d3a900218429486ea69fd4552e3d476526a6883cbd5556c6534b48
8801e319d5 refactor: remove unused `CKey::Negate` method (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
This method was introduced as a pre-requirement for the v2 transport protocol back then (see PR #14047, commit 463921bb), when it was still BIP151. With the replacement BIP324, this is not needed anymore, and it's also unlikely that for any other proposal we'd ever need to negate private keys at this abstraction level. I'd argue that this operation is usually something that should happen within a secp256k1 module (like e.g. done in MuSig2, Silent Payments...).
(If there is really demand in the future, it's also trivial to reintroduce the method.)
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK 8801e319d5
sipa:
ACK 8801e319d5
achow101:
ACK 8801e319d5
Tree-SHA512: 7bc1566399635c5c6e4940a2724c865d5443eb190024379099330c023c516f1e4f423ed9e8c42bc93413b723a5464ec79d3f879f58c0e598fe24f495238df4ec
22d0f1a27e [fuzz] Avoid endless waiting in FuzzedSock::{Wait,WaitMany} (marcofleon)
a7fceda68b [fuzz] Make peeking through FuzzedSock::Recv fuzzer friendly (dergoegge)
865cdf3692 [fuzz] Use fuzzer friendly ConsumeRandomLengthByteVector in FuzzedSock::Recv (dergoegge)
Pull request description:
`FuzzedSock` has a few issues that block a fuzzer from making progress. See commit messages for details.
ACKs for top commit:
marcofleon:
Tested ACK 22d0f1a27e
brunoerg:
utACK 22d0f1a27e
Tree-SHA512: 2d66fc94ba58b6652ae234bd1dcd33b7d685b5054fe83e0cd624b053dd51519c23148f43a865ab8c8bc5fc2dc25e701952831b99159687474978a90348faa4c5
This method was introduced as a pre-requirement for the v2 transport
protocol back then (see PR #14047, commit 463921bb), when it was still
BIP151. With the replacement BIP324, this is not needed anymore, and
it's also unlikely that any other proposal would need to negate private
keys at this abstraction level.
(If there is really demand, it's trivial to reintroduce the method.)
Currently, when the FuzzedDataProvider of a FuzzedSock runs out of data,
FuzzedSock::Wait and WaitMany will simulate endless waiting as the
requested events are never simulated as occured.
Fix this by simulating event occurence when ConsumeBool() returns false
(e.g. when the data provider runs out).
Co-authored-by: dergoegge <n.goeggi@gmail.com>
FuzzedSock only supports peeking at one byte at a time, which is not
fuzzer friendly when trying to receive long data.
Fix this by supporting peek data of arbitrary length instead of only one
byte.
b3efb48673 protocol: make message types constexpr (Vasil Dimov)
2fa9de06c2 net: make the list of known message types a compile time constant (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
Turn the `std::vector` to `std::array` because it is cheaper and allows us to have the number of the messages as a compile time constant: `ALL_NET_MESSAGE_TYPES.size()` which can be used in future code to build other `std::array`s with that size.
---
This change is part of https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29418 but it makes sense on its own and would be good to have it, regardless of the fate of https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29418. Also, if this is merged, that would reduce the size of https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29418, thus the current standalone PR.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK b3efb48673
jonatack:
ACK b3efb48673
maflcko:
utACK b3efb48673🎊
willcl-ark:
ACK b3efb48673
Tree-SHA512: 6d3860c138c64514ebab13d97ea67893e2d346dfac30a48c3d9bc769a1970407375ea4170afdb522411ced306a14a9af4eede99e964d1fb1ea3efff5d5eb57af
9408a04e42 tests, fuzz: use new NUMS_H const (josibake)
b946f8a4c5 crypto: add NUMS_H const (josibake)
Pull request description:
Broken out from #28122
---
[BIP341](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki#constructing-and-spending-taproot-outputs) defines a NUMS point `H` as *H = lift_x(0x50929b74c1a04954b78b4b6035e97a5e078a5a0f28ec96d547bfee9ace803ac0)* which is [constructed](11af7015de/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h (L16)) by taking the hash of the standard uncompressed encoding of the [secp256k1](https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf) base point G as X coordinate."
Add this as a constant so it can be used in our codebase. My primary motivation is BIP352 specifies a special case for when taproot spends use `H` as the internal key, but outside of BIP352 it seems generally useful to have `H` in the codebase, for testing or other use cases.
ACKs for top commit:
paplorinc:
re-ACK 9408a04e42
achow101:
ACK 9408a04e42
theStack:
Code-review ACK 9408a04e42
Tree-SHA512: ad84492f5d635c0cb05bd82546079ded7e5138e95361f20d8285a9ad6e69c10ee2cc3fe46e16b46ef03c4253c8bee1051911c6b91264c90c3b1ad33a824bff4b
0fb17bf61a [log] updates in TxOrphanage (glozow)
b16da7eda7 [functional test] attackers sending mutated orphans (glozow)
6675f6428d [unit test] TxOrphanage handling of same-txid-different-witness txns (glozow)
8923edfc1f [p2p] allow entries with the same txid in TxOrphanage (glozow)
c31f148166 [refactor] TxOrphanage::EraseTx by wtxid (glozow)
efcc593017 [refactor] TxOrphanage::HaveTx only by wtxid (glozow)
7e475b9648 [p2p] don't query orphanage by txid (glozow)
Pull request description:
Part of #27463 in the "make orphan handling more robust" section.
Currently the main map in `TxOrphanage` is indexed by txid; we do not allow 2 transactions with the same txid into TxOrphanage. This means that if we receive a transaction and want to store it in orphanage, we'll fail to do so if a same-txid-different-witness version of the tx already exists in the orphanage. The existing orphanage entry can stay until it expires 20 minutes later, or until we find that it is invalid.
This means an attacker can try to block/delay us accepting an orphan transaction by sending a mutated version of the child ahead of time. See included test.
Prior to #28970, we don't rely on the orphanage for anything and it would be relatively difficult to guess what transaction will go to a node's orphanage. After the parent(s) are accepted, if anybody sends us the correct transaction, we'll end up accepting it. However, this is a bit more painful for 1p1c: it's easier for an attacker to tell when a tx is going to hit a node's orphanage, and we need to store the correct orphan + receive the parent before we'll consider the package. If we start out with a bad orphan, we can't evict it until we receive the parent + try the 1p1c, and then we'll need to download the real child, put it in orphanage, download the parent again, and then retry 1p1c.
ACKs for top commit:
AngusP:
ACK 0fb17bf61a
itornaza:
trACK 0fb17bf61a
instagibbs:
ACK 0fb17bf61a
theStack:
ACK 0fb17bf61a
sr-gi:
crACK [0fb17bf](0fb17bf61a)
stickies-v:
ACK 0fb17bf61a
Tree-SHA512: edcbac7287c628bc27036920c2d4e4f63ec65087fbac1de9319c4f541515d669fc4e5fdc30c8b9a248b720da42b89153d388e91c7bf5caf4bc5b3b931ded1f59
58594c7040 fuzz: txorphan tests fixups (Sergi Delgado Segura)
Pull request description:
Motivated by https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28970#discussion_r1576401327
Adds the following fixups in txorphan fuzz tests:
- Don't bond the output count of the created orphans to the number of available coins
- Allow duplicate inputs but don't store duplicate outpoints
Most significantly, this gets rid of the `duplicate_input` flag altogether, making the test easier to reason about. Notice how, under normal conditions, duplicate inputs would be caught by `MemPoolAccept::PreChecks`, however, no validations checks are run on the test before adding data to the orphanage (neither were they before this patch)
## Rationale
The way the test is currently written, duplicate inputs are allowed based on a random flag (`duplicate_input`). If the flag is unset, upon selecting an outpoint as input for a new transaction, the input is popped to prevent re-selection and later re-added to the collection (once all inputs have been picked). However, the re-addition to the collection is performed independently of whether the flag was set or not. This means that, if the flag is set, the selected inputs are duplicated which in turn makes these inputs more likely to be re-picked in the following iteration of the loop.
Additionally, both the input and output count of the transaction are bonded to the number of available outpoints. This makes sense for the former, but the latter shouldn't be.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
utACK 58594c7040
glozow:
ACK 58594c7
instagibbs:
ACK 58594c7040
Tree-SHA512: e97cc2a43e388f87b64d2e4e45f929dd5b0dd85d668dd693b75e4c9ceea734cd7645952385d428208d07b70e1aafbec84cc2ec264a2e07d36fc8ba3e97885a8d
It seems modern compilers don't realize that all invocations of operator""_mst
can be evaluated at compile time, despite the constexpr keyword.
Since C++20, we can force them to evaluate at compile time, turning all the
miniscript type constants into actual compile-time constants.
It appears that MSVC does not support consteval operator"" when used inside
certain expressions. For the few places where this happens, define a
constant outside the operator call.
Co-Authored-By: Hennadii Stepanov <32963518+hebasto@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds the following fixups in txorphan fuzz tests:
- Don't bond the output count of the created orphans based on the number of available coins
- Allow duplicate inputs, when applicable, but don't store duplicate outpoints
Rationale
---------
The way the test is currently written, duplicate inputs are allowed based on a random flag (`duplicate_input`).
If the flag is unset, upon selecting an outpoint as input for a new transaction, the input is popped to prevent re-selection,
and later re-added to the collection (once all inputs have been picked). However, the re-addition to the collection is performed independently of whether the flag was set or not.
This means that, if the flag is set, the selected inputs are duplicated which in turn makes these inputs more likely to be re-picked in the following iteration of the loop.
Additionally, both the input and output count of the transaction and bonded to the number of available outpoints. This makes sense for the former, but the latter shouldn't be.
c6be144c4b Remove timedata (stickies-v)
92e72b5d0d [net processing] Move IgnoresIncomingTxs to PeerManagerInfo (dergoegge)
7d9c3ec622 [net processing] Introduce PeerManagerInfo (dergoegge)
ee178dfcc1 Add TimeOffsets helper class (stickies-v)
55361a15d1 [net processing] Use std::chrono for type-safe time offsets (stickies-v)
038fd979ef [net processing] Move nTimeOffset to net_processing (dergoegge)
Pull request description:
[An earlier approach](1d226ae1f9/) in #28956 involved simplifying and refactoring the network-adjusted time calculation logic, but this was eventually [left out](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28956#issuecomment-1904214370) of the PR to make it easier for reviewers to focus on consensus logic changes.
Since network-adjusted time is now only used for warning/informational purposes, cleaning up the logic (building on @dergoegge's approach in #28956) should be quite straightforward and uncontroversial. The main changes are:
- Previously, we would only calculate the time offset from the first 199 outbound peers that we connected to. This limitation is now removed, and we have a proper rolling calculation. I've reduced the set to 50 outbound peers, which seems plenty.
- Previously, we would automatically use the network-adjusted time if the difference was < 70 mins, and warn the user if the difference was larger than that. Since there is no longer any automated time adjustment, I've changed the warning threshold to ~~20~~ 10 minutes (which is an arbitrary number).
- Previously, a warning would only be raised once, and then never again until node restart. This behaviour is now updated to 1) warn to log for every new outbound peer for as long as we appear out of sync, 2) have the RPC warning toggled on/off whenever we go in/out of sync, and 3) have the GUI warn whenever we are out of sync (again), but limited to 1 messagebox per 60 minutes
- no more globals
- remove the `-maxtimeadjustment` startup arg
Closes #4521
ACKs for top commit:
sr-gi:
Re-ACK [c6be144](c6be144c4b)
achow101:
reACK c6be144c4b
dergoegge:
utACK c6be144c4b
Tree-SHA512: 1063d639542e882186cdcea67d225ad1f97847f44253621a8c4b36c4d777e8f5cb0efe86bc279f01e819d33056ae4364c3300cc7400c087fb16c3f39b3e16b96
e518a8bf8a [functional test] opportunistic 1p1c package submission (glozow)
87c5c524d6 [p2p] opportunistically accept 1-parent-1-child packages (glozow)
6c51e1d7d0 [p2p] add separate rejections cache for reconsiderable txns (glozow)
410ebd6efa [fuzz] break out parent functions and add GetChildrenFrom* coverage (glozow)
d095316c1c [unit test] TxOrphanage::GetChildrenFrom* (glozow)
2f51cd680f [txorphanage] add method to get all orphans spending a tx (glozow)
092c978a42 [txpackages] add canonical way to get hash of package (glozow)
c3c1e15831 [doc] restore comment about why we check if ptx HasWitness before caching rejected txid (glozow)
6f4da19cc3 guard against MempoolAcceptResult::m_replaced_transactions (glozow)
Pull request description:
This enables 1p1c packages to propagate in the "happy case" (i.e. not reliable if there are adversaries) and contains a lot of package relay-related code. See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27463 for overall package relay tracking.
Rationale: This is "non-robust 1-parent-1-child package relay" which is immediately useful.
- Relaying 1-parent-1-child CPFP when mempool min feerate is high would be a subset of all package relay use cases, but a pretty significant improvement over what we have today, where such transactions don't propagate at all. [1]
- Today, a miner can run this with a normal/small maxmempool to get revenue from 1p1c CPFP'd transactions without losing out on the ones with parents below mempool minimum feerate.
- The majority of this code is useful for building more featureful/robust package relay e.g. see the code in #27742.
The first 2 commits are followups from #29619:
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29619#discussion_r1523094034
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29619#discussion_r1519819257
Q: What makes this short of a more full package relay feature?
(1) it only supports packages in which 1 of the parents needs to be CPFP'd by the child. That includes 1-parent-1-child packages and situations in which the other parents already pay for themselves (and are thus in mempool already when the package is submitted). More general package relay is a future improvement that requires more engineering in mempool and validation - see #27463.
(2) We rely on having kept the child in orphanage, and don't make any attempt to protect it while we wait to receive the parent. If we are experiencing a lot of orphanage churn (e.g. an adversary is purposefully sending us a lot of transactions with missing inputs), we will fail to submit packages. This limitation has been around for 12+ years, see #27742 which adds a token bucket scheme for protecting package-related orphans at a limited rate per peer.
(3) Our orphan-handling logic is somewhat opportunistic; we don't make much effort to resolve an orphan beyond asking the child's sender for the parents. This means we may miss packages if the first sender fails to give us the parent (intentionally or unintentionally). To make this more robust, we need receiver-side logic to retry orphan resolution with multiple peers. This is also an existing problem which has a proposed solution in #28031.
[1]: see this writeup and its links 02ec218c78/bip-0331.mediawiki (propagate-high-feerate-transactions)
ACKs for top commit:
sr-gi:
tACK e518a8bf8a
instagibbs:
reACK e518a8bf8a
theStack:
Code-review ACK e518a8bf8a📦
dergoegge:
light Code review ACK e518a8bf8a
achow101:
ACK e518a8bf8a
Tree-SHA512: 632579fbe7160cb763bbec6d82ca0dab484d5dbbc7aea90c187c0b9833b8d7c1e5d13b8587379edd3a3b4a02a5a1809020369e9cd09a4ebaf729921f65c15943
cc15c5bfd1 fuzz: don't allow adding duplicate transactions to the mempool (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
Filter duplicate transaction ids from being added to the mempool in the `partially_downloaded_block` fuzz target.
I think a prerequisite for calling `CTxMemPool::addUnchecked` should be that the underlying txid doesn't already exist in the mempool (otherwise `addUnchecked` would need a way to return failure, which we don't currently have).
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
utACK cc15c5bfd1 makes sense to me
maflcko:
lgtm ACK cc15c5bfd1
brunoerg:
ACK cc15c5bfd1
dergoegge:
utACK cc15c5bfd1
Tree-SHA512: 85f84ce405aba584e6d00391515f0a86c5648ce8b2da69036e50a6c1f6833d050d09b1972cc5ffbe7c4edb3e5f7f965ef34bd839deeddac27a889cc8d2e53b8f
It's very hard to randomly construct a transaction that would be the
parent of an existing orphanage tx. For functions like
AddChildrenToWorkSet and GetChildren that take orphan parents, use a tx
that was previously constructed.
992c714451 common: Don't terminate on null character in UrlDecode (Fabian Jahr)
099fa57151 scripted-diff: Modernize name of urlDecode function and param (Fabian Jahr)
8f39aaae41 refactor: Remove hooking code for urlDecode (Fabian Jahr)
650d43ec15 refactor: Replace libevent use in urlDecode with our own code (Fabian Jahr)
46bc6c2aaa test: Add unit tests for urlDecode (Fabian Jahr)
Pull request description:
Fixes #29654 (as a side-effect)
Removing dependencies is a general goal of the project and the xz backdoor has been an additional wake up call recently. Libevent shows many of the same symptoms, few maintainers and slow releases. While libevent can not be removed completely over night we should start removing it’s usage where it's possible, ideally with the end goal to removing it completely.
This is a pretty easy win in that direction. The [`evhttp_uridecode` function from libevent](e0a4574ba2/http.c (L3542)) we were using in `urlDecode` could be easily emulated in fewer LOC. This also ports the [applicable test vectors over from libevent](https://github.com/libevent/libevent/blob/master/test/regress_http.c#L3430).
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 992c714451
theStack:
Code-review ACK 992c714451
maflcko:
ACK 992c714451👈
stickies-v:
ACK 992c714451
Tree-SHA512: 78f76ae7ab3b6710eab2aaac20f55eb0da7803e057eaa6220e865f328666a5399ef1a479702aaf630b2f974ad3aa15e2b6adac9c11bc8c3d4be21e8af1667fea
016ed248ba fuzz: explicitly cap the vsize of RBFs for diagram checks (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
In master we are hitting a case where vsize transactions much larger than max standard size are causing an overflow in not-yet-exposed RBF diagram checking code: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29757#issuecomment-2049220195
`ConsumeTxMemPoolEntry` is creating entries with tens of thousands of sigops cost, causing the resulting RBFs to be "overly large".
To fix this I cause the fuzz test to stop adding transactions to the mempool when we reach a potential overflow of `int32_t`.
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
ACK 016ed248ba
marcofleon:
ACK 016ed248ba. I ran libFuzzer on `package_rbf` on the current master branch until the overflow was encountered. Then I built the PR branch and ran the fuzzer using the crash input.
Tree-SHA512: b3ffc98d2c4598eb3010edd58b9370aab1441aafbb1044c83b2b90c17dfe9135b8de9dba475dd0108863c1ffedede443cd978e95231a41cf1f0715629197fa51
4ba1d0b553 fuzz: Add coverage for client_maxfeerate (Greg Sanders)
91d7d8f22a AcceptMultipleTransactions: Fix workspace client_maxfeerate (Greg Sanders)
f3aa5bd5eb fill_mempool: assertions and docsctring update (Greg Sanders)
a3da63e8fe Move fill_mempool to util function (Greg Sanders)
73b68bd8b4 fill_mempool: remove subtest-specific comment (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
Bug causes an `Assume()` failure due to the expectation that the individual result should be invalid when done over `submitpackage` via rpc.
Bug introduced by https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28950 , and I discovered it rebasing https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28984 since it's easier to hit in that test scenario.
Tests in place were only checking `AcceptSingleTransaction`-level checks due to package evaluation only triggering when minfee is too high for the parent transaction.
Added test along with fix, moving the fill_mempool utility into a common area for re-use.
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
reACK 4ba1d0b553
theStack:
ACK 4ba1d0b553
ismaelsadeeq:
re-ACK 4ba1d0b553 via [diff](4fe7d150eb..4ba1d0b553)
Tree-SHA512: 3729bdf7f25d04e232f173ccee04ddbb2afdaafa3d04292a01cecf58fb11b3b2bc133e8490277f1a67622b62d17929c242dc980f9bb647896beea4332ee35306
This helper class is an alternative to CMedianFilter, but without a
lot of the special logic and exceptions that we needed while it was
still used for consensus.
a8203e9412 refactor: Simplify `extra_txn` to be a vec of CTransactionRef instead of a vec of pair<Wtxid, CTransactionRef> (AngusP)
c3c18433ae refactor: Use typesafe Wtxid in compact block encoding message, instead of ambiguous uint256. (AngusP)
Pull request description:
The first commit replaces `uint256` with typesafe `Wtxid` (or `Txid`) types introduced in #28107.
The second commit then simplifies the extra tx `vector` to just be of `CTransactionRef`s instead of a `std::pair<Wtxid, CTransactionRef>`, as it's easy to get a `Wtxid` from a transaction ref.
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
ACK a8203e9412
dergoegge:
ACK a8203e9412
Tree-SHA512: b4ba1423a8059f9fc118782bd8a668213d229c822f22b01267de74d6ea97fe4f2aad46b5da7c0178ecc9905293e9a0eafba1d75330297c055e27fd53c8c8ebfd
All `CTransactionRef` have `.GetWitnessHash()` that returns a cached `const Wtxid` (since fac1223a56),
so we don't need to pass transaction refs around with their IDs as they're easy to get from a ref.
80f8b92f4f remove libbitcoinconsensus (fanquake)
Pull request description:
This was deprecated in `v27.0`, for removal in `v28.0`. See discussion in PR #29189.
ACKs for top commit:
theuni:
Concept ACK and light review ACK 80f8b92f4f. My only hesitation here is that (afaics?) there's now nothing keeping undesired features like threading or globals from working their way into the interpreter in future commits.
m3dwards:
Concept ACK 80f8b92f4f
TheCharlatan:
ACK 80f8b92f4f
hebasto:
ACK 80f8b92f4f, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK.
Tree-SHA512: 17a62118aeb088f2695c892bb32794dfea3061e3cb7d9e8e9f1c06c3ff6f63a7587fa532e37edbb91fbc5a19b12c9a0f8e05fa9e8864aa07f92665375d847e80
