8dec4e1294 fuzz: fix timeout in `crypto_fschacha20poly1305` (brunoerg)
Pull request description:
Fixes #30505
This PR fixes a timeout in `crypto_fschacha20poly1305` by reducing the number of iterations. I left it running for a while and noticed it speeds up the target and do not impact coverage.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
lgtm ACK 8dec4e1294
stratospher:
ACK 8dec4e1. saw similar coverage stats (these are from different machines, saw more similar from same machine).
Tree-SHA512: 66cd689f10f09cf880c1f2c77aa481336a95a7e10b655d156b2dc9cd38165670000019a6fb3775485ccb5cce248939a52a31ebd755a6befed6274cc841d21d97
49f9b645ea refactor: Testnet4 - Replace uint256S("str") -> uint256{"str"} (Hodlinator)
Pull request description:
Ran scripted-diff from 2d9d752e4f:
```
sed -i --regexp-extended -e 's/\buint256S\("(0x)?([^"]{64})"\)/uint256{"\2"}/g' $(git grep -l uint256S)
```
Follow-up to Testnet4 introduction #29775 which overlapped with work on `uint256` `consteval` ctor #30560 (the latter includes the scripted-diff commit).
Going forward `uint256{}` should be used for constants instead of `uint256S()`.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
review-ACK 49f9b645ea🐮
fjahr:
ACK 49f9b645ea
Tree-SHA512: 94fe5d9f1fb85e9ce5c3c4c5e4c31667e8cbb55ee691a4b5b3ae4172ccac38230281071023663965917f188b4c19bdf67afd4e3cdf69d89e97c65faea88af833
18d65d2772 test: use uint256::FromUserHex for RANDOM_CTX_SEED (stickies-v)
6819e5a329 node: use uint256::FromUserHex for -assumevalid parsing (stickies-v)
2e58fdb544 util: remove unused IsHexNumber (stickies-v)
8a44d7d3c1 node: use uint256::FromUserHex for -minimumchainwork parsing (stickies-v)
70e2c87737 refactor: add uint256::FromUserHex helper (stickies-v)
85b7cbfcbe test: unittest chainstatemanager_args (stickies-v)
Pull request description:
Since fad2991ba0, `uint256S` has been [deprecated](fad2991ba0 (diff-800776e2dda39116e889839f69409571a5d397de048a141da7e4003bc099e3e2R138)) because it is less robust than the `base_blob::FromHex()` introduced in [the same PR](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30482). Specifically, it tries to recover from length-mismatches, recover from untrimmed whitespace, 0x-prefix and garbage at the end, instead of simply requiring exactly 64 hex-only characters. _(see also #30532)_
This PR carves out the few `uint256S` callsites that may potentially prove a bit more controversial to change because they deal with user input and backwards incompatible behaviour change.
The main behaviour change introduced in this PR is:
- `-minimumchainwork` will raise an error when input is longer than 64 hex digits
- `-assumevalid` will raise an error when input contains invalid hex characters, or when it is longer than 64 hex digits
- test: the optional RANDOM_CTX_SEED env var will now cause tests to abort when it contains invalid hex characters, or when it is longer than 64 hex digits
After this PR, the remaining work to remove `uint256S` completely is almost entirely mechanical and/or test related. I will open that PR once #30560 is merged because it builds on that.
ACKs for top commit:
hodlinator:
re-ACK 18d65d2772
l0rinc:
ACK 18d65d2772
achow101:
ACK 18d65d2772
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 18d65d2772. Very nice change that cleans up the API, adds checking for invalid values, makes parsing of values more consistent, and adds test coverage.
Tree-SHA512: ec118ea3d56e1dfbc4c79acdbfc797f65c4d2107b0ca9577c848b4ab9b7cb8d05db9f3c7fe8441a09291aca41bf671572431f4eddc59be8fb53abbea76bbbf86
fa7b9b99a2 refactor: Require std::input_iterator for all InputIterator in prevector (MarcoFalke)
d444441900 refactor: Allow CScript construction from any std::input_iterator (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Currently only (pre)vector iterators and raw pointers are accepted. However, this makes it harder to construct from input iterators provided by other classes, such as `std::span`.
Fix that.
ACKs for top commit:
delta1:
reACK fa7b9b9
achow101:
ACK fa7b9b99a2
hodlinator:
ACK fa7b9b99a2
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK fa7b9b99a2
Tree-SHA512: 2760861f8bce42fb27dc0825e61621cb157f1ac3619a0834df38eb8319b6dcf9de43d90397a4c160f43340880c1553df638848e9057a27c792214331243ef4a5
fab0e834b8 bench: [refactor] iwyu (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Missing includes are problematic, because:
* Upcoming releases of a C++ standard library implementation often minimize their internal header dependencies. For example, `_LIBCPP_REMOVE_TRANSITIVE_INCLUDES` (https://libcxx.llvm.org/DesignDocs/HeaderRemovalPolicy.html). This can lead to compile failures, which are easy to fix for developers, but may not be for users. For example, commit 138f867156 had to add missing includes to accommodate GCC 15 (and the commit had to be backported).
* A Bitcoin Core developer removing a feature from a module and wanting to drop the now unused includes may not be able to do so without touching other unrelated files, because those files rely on the transitive includes.
Moreover, missing or extraneous includes are problematic, because they may be confusing the code reader as to what the real dependencies are.
Finally, extraneous includes may slow down the build.
Fix all issues in `bench`, by applying the rule include-what-you-use (iwyu).
Follow-up pull requests will handle the other places.
ACKs for top commit:
hodlinator:
ACK fab0e834b8
achow101:
ACK fab0e834b8
TheCharlatan:
ACK fab0e834b8
hebasto:
ACK fab0e834b8.
brunoerg:
crACK fab0e834b8
stickies-v:
ACK fab0e834b8
Tree-SHA512: f079c05d3ddebafabbd5a6c76d43d17337d1a962b97ba0ee27612f91c58491e7ce4e4229be54bd6e75a15512798c6f59925d0a076a37c050f8b9ef455ae5c9a2
b061b35105 seeds: Regenerate mainnet seeds (virtu)
02dc45c506 seeds: Pull nodes from Luke's seeder (virtu)
7a2068a0ff seeds: Pull nodes from virtu's crawler (virtu)
Pull request description:
This builds on #30008 and adds data [exported](https://github.com/virtu/seed-exporter) by [my crawler](https://github.com/virtu/p2p-crawler) an additional source for seed nodes. Data covers all supported network types.
[edit: Added Luke's seeder as input as well.]
### Motivation
- Further decentralizes the seed node selection process (in the long term potentially enabling an _n_-source threshold for nodes to prevent a single source from entering malicious nodes)
- No longer need to manually curate seed node list for any network type: See last paragraph of OP in #30008. My crawler has been [discovering the handful of available cjdns nodes](https://21.ninja/reachable-nodes/nodes-by-net-type/) for around two months, all but one of which meet the reliability criteria.
- Alignment of uptime requirements for Onion and I2P nodes with those of clearnet nodes to 50%: If I'm reading the code correctly, seeders appear to optimize for up-to-dateness by using [lower connection timeouts](3c1a63c672/src/crawl.rs (L349)) than [Bitcoin Core](bc87ad9854/src/netbase.cpp (L40C27-L40C48)) to maximize throughput. Since my crawler does not have the same timeliness requirements, it opts for accuracy by using generous timeouts. As a result, its data contains additional eligible Onion (and other darknet nodes), as is shown in the histogram below. Around 4500 Onion nodes are discovered so far (blue); my data adds ~6400 more (orange); ~ 1500 nodes take longer than the default 20-second Bitcoin Core timeout and won't qualify as "good".
Here's the current results with 512 nodes for all networks except cjdns:
<details>
<summary>Using the extra data</summary>
```
IPv4 IPv6 Onion I2P CJDNS Pass
10335 2531 11545 1589 10 Initial
10335 2531 11545 1589 10 Skip entries with invalid address
5639 1431 11163 1589 8 After removing duplicates
5606 1417 11163 1589 8 Enforce minimal number of blocks
5606 1417 11163 1589 8 Require service bit 1
4873 1228 11163 1589 8 Require minimum uptime
4846 1225 11161 1588 8 Require a known and recent user agent
4846 1225 11161 1588 8 Filter out hosts with multiple bitcoin ports
512 512 512 512 8 Look up ASNs and limit results per ASN and per net
```
</details>
<details>
<summary>Before</summary>
```
IPv4 IPv6 Onion I2P CJDNS Pass
5772 1323 443 0 2 Initial
5772 1323 443 0 2 Skip entries with invalid address
4758 1110 443 0 2 After removing duplicates
4723 1094 443 0 2 Enforce minimal number of blocks
4723 1094 443 0 2 Require service bit 1
3732 867 443 0 2 Require minimum uptime
3718 864 443 0 2 Require a known and recent user agent
3718 864 443 0 2 Filter out hosts with multiple bitcoin ports
512 409 443 0 2 Look up ASNs and limit results per ASN and per net
```
</details>
### To dos
- [x] Remove manual nodes and update README
- [x] Mark nodes with connection times exceeding Bitcoin Core's default as bad in [exporter](https://github.com/virtu/seed-exporter): [done](https://github.com/virtu/seed-exporter/pull/12)
- [x] Regenerate mainnet seeds
- [x] Rebase, then remove WIP label once #30008 gets merged
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK b061b35105
fjahr:
utACK b061b35105
Tree-SHA512: 63e86220787251c7e8d2d5957bad69352e19ae17d7b9b2d27d8acddfec5bdafe588edb68d77d19c57f25f149de723e2eeadded0c8cf13eaca22dc33bd8cf92a0
1b41d45d46 wallet: bugfix: ensure atomicity in settings updates (ismaelsadeeq)
Pull request description:
This PR fixes #30620.
As outlined in the issue, creating two wallets with `load_on_startup=true` simultaneously results in only one wallet being added to the startup file.
The current issue arises because the wallet settings update process involves:
1. Obtaining the settings value while acquiring the settings lock.
2. Modifying the settings value.
3. Overwriting the settings value while acquiring the settings lock again.
This sequence is not thread-safe. Different threads could modify the same base value simultaneously, overwriting data from other workers without realizing it.
The PR attempts to fix this by modifying the chain interface's `updateRwSetting` method to accept a function that will be called with the settings reference. This function will either update or delete the setting and return an enum indicating whether the settings need to be overwritten in this or not.
Additionally, this PR introduces two new methods to the chain interface:
- `overwriteRwSetting`: This method replaces the setting with a new value.
Used in `VerifyWallets`
- `deleteRwSettings`: This method completely erases a specified setting.
This method is currently used only in `overwriteRwSetting`.
These changes ensure that updates are race-free across all clients.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 1b41d45d46
furszy:
self-code-ACK 1b41d45d46
Tree-SHA512: 50cda612b782aeb5e03e2cf63cc44779a013de1c535b883b57af4de22f24b0de80b4edecbcda235413baec0a12bdf0e5750fb6731c9e67d32e742d8c63f08c13
Regenerate mainnet seeds from new sources without the need for hardcoded
data. Result has 512 nodes from each network type except cjdns, for
which only eight nodes were found that match the seed node criteria.
Because we don't have type checking for command-line/settings/config
args, strings are interpreted as 'false' for non-boolean args.
By convention, this "forces" us to interpret negated strings as 'true',
which conflicts with the negated option definition in all the settings
classes (they expect negated options to always be false and ignore any
other value preceding them). Consequently, when retrieving all "wallet"
values from the command-line/settings/config, we also fetch the negated
string boolean value, which is not of the expected 'string' type.
This mismatch leads to an internal fatal error, resulting in an unclean
shutdown during initialization. Furthermore, this error displays a poorly
descriptive error message:
"JSON value of type bool is not of expected type string"
This commit fixes the fatal error by ensuring that only string values are
returned in the "wallet" settings list, failing otherwise. It also improves
the clarity of the returned error message.
Co-authored-by: Ryan Ofsky <ryan@ofsky.org>
41ad84a00c seeds: Use fjahr's more up to date asmap (Ava Chow)
d8fd1e0faf seeds: Fixed seeds update (Ava Chow)
f1f24d7214 seeds: Add testnet4 fixed seeds file (Ava Chow)
8ace71c737 seeds: Remove manual onion and i2p seeds (Ava Chow)
ed5b86cbe4 seeds: Add testnet instructions (Ava Chow)
0676515397 seeds: Also pull from achow101 seeder (Ava Chow)
5bab3175a6 makeseeds: Configurable minimum blocks for testnet4's smaller chain (Ava Chow)
d2465dfac6 makeseeds: Shuffle ips after parsing (Ava Chow)
af550b3a0f makeseeds: Support CJDNS (Ava Chow)
d5a8c4c4bd makeseeds: Update user agent regex (Ava Chow)
Pull request description:
The [DNS seeder](https://github.com/achow101/dnsseedrs) that I wrote collects statistics on node reliability in the same way that sipa's seeder does, and also outputs this information in the same file format. Thus it can also be used in our fixed seeds update scripts. My seeder additionally crawls onion v3, i2p, and cjdns, so will now be able to set those fixed seeds automatically rather than curating manual lists.
In doing this update, I've found that `makeseeds.py` is missing newer versions from the regex as well as cjdns support; both of these have been updated.
I also noticed that the testnet fixed seeds are all manually curated and sipa's seeder does not appear to publish any testnet data. Since I am also running the seeder for testnet, I've added the commands to generate testnet fixed seeds from my seeder's data too.
Lastly, I've updated all of the fixed seeds. However, since my seeder has not found any cjdns nodes that met the reliability criteria (possibly due to connectivity issues present in those networks), I've left the previous manual seeds for that network.
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
re-ACK 41ad84a00c
virtu:
ACK [41ad84a](41ad84a00c)
Tree-SHA512: 6ba0141f053d9d6ae7d8c9574f061be38f3e65b28de1d6660c1885ab942623b5a0ec70754b4fcfc5d98fe970f5f179a940d5880b5061ed698f7932500e01d3ee
- Settings updates were not thread-safe, as they were executed in
three separate steps:
1) Obtain settings value while acquiring the settings lock.
2) Modify settings value.
3) Overwrite settings value while acquiring the settings lock.
This approach allowed concurrent threads to modify the same base value
simultaneously, leading to data loss. When this occurred, the final
settings state would only reflect the changes from the last thread
that completed the operation, overwriting updates from other threads.
Fix this by making the settings update operation atomic.
- Add test coverage for this behavior.
Co-authored-by: furszy <matiasfurszyfer@protonmail.com>
Accepting any Rng in RandMoney makes tests more flexible to use a
different Rng. Also, passing in the Rng clarifies the call sites, so
that they all use g_rand_ctx explicitly and consistently.
The global g_insecure_rand_ctx will be removed in the future, so
removing it from this helper is useful.
Also, tying the two concepts of the global internal RNGState and the
global test-only rng context is a bit confusing, because tests can
simply use the m_rng, if it exists. Also, tests may seed more than one
random context, or none at all, or a random context of a different type.
Fix all issues by moving the Reseed call to the two places where it is
used.
60055f1abc test: replace deprecated secp256k1 context flags usage (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
The flags `SECP256K1_CONTEXT_{SIGN,VERIFY}` have been marked as deprecated since libsecp256k1 version 0.2 (released in December 2022), with the recommendation to use SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE instead, see https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/1126 and 1988855079/CHANGELOG.md (L132). Note that in contrast to other deprecated functions/variables, these defines don't have a deprecated attribute and hence don't lead to a compiler warning (see https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/pull/1126#discussion_r922105271), so they are not easily detected.
ACKs for top commit:
TheCharlatan:
ACK 60055f1abc
ismaelsadeeq:
utACK 60055f1abc
tdb3:
light CR and test ACK 60055f1abc
Tree-SHA512: d93cf49e018a58469620c0d2f50242141f22dabc70afb2a7cd64e416f4f55588714510ae5a877376dd1e6b6f7494261969489af4b18a1c9dff0d0dfdf93f1fa8
Removes dependency on unsafe and deprecated uint256S.
This makes parsing more strict, by requiring RANDOM_CTX_SEED
to be a string of up to 64 hex digits (optionally prefixed with
"0x"), whereas previously any string would be accepted, with
non-hex characters silently ignored and input longer than
64 characters (ignoring "0x" prefix) silently trimmed.
Can be tested with:
$ RANDOM_CTX_SEED=z ./src/test/test_bitcoin --log_level=all --run_test=timeoffsets_tests/timeoffsets_warning -- -printtoconsole=1 | grep RANDOM_CTX_SEED
RANDOM_CTX_SEED must consist of up to 64 hex digits ("0x" prefix allowed), it was set to: 'z'.
Co-Authored-By: MarcoFalke <*~=`'#}+{/-|&$^_@721217.xyz>
Removes dependency on unsafe and deprecated uint256S.
This makes parsing more strict, by returning an error
when the input contains non-hex characters, or when it
contains more than 64 hex digits.
Also make feature_assumevalid.py more robust by using CBlock.hash
which is guaranteed to be 64 characters long, as opposed to the
variable-length hex(CBlock.sha256)
Removes dependency on unsafe and deprecated uint256S.
This makes parsing more strict, by returning an error
when the input contains more than 64 hex digits.
FromUserHex will be used in future commits to construct
uint256 instances from user hex input without being
unnecessarily restrictive on formatting by allowing
0x-prefixed input that is shorter than 64 characters.
59ff17e5af miner: adjust clock to timewarp rule (Sjors Provoost)
e929054e12 Add timewarp attack mitigation test (Sjors Provoost)
e85f386c4b consensus: enable BIP94 on regtest (Sjors Provoost)
dd154b0568 consensus: lower regtest nPowTargetTimespan to 144 (Sjors Provoost)
Pull request description:
Because #30647 reduced the timewarp attack threshold from 7200s to 600s, our miner code will fail to propose a block template (on testnet4) if the last block of the previous period has a timestamp two hours in the future. This PR fixes that and also adds a test.
The non-test changes in the last commit should be in v28, otherwise miners have to patch it themselves. If necessary I can split that out into a separate PR, but I prefer to get the tests in as well.
In order to add the test, we activate BIP94 on regtest.
In order for the test to run faster, we reduce its difficulty retarget period to 144, the same number that's already used for softfork activation logic. Regtest does not actually adjust its difficulty, so this change has no effect (except for `getnetworkhashps`, see commit).
An alternative approach would be to run this test on testnet4, by hardcoding its first 2015 in the test suite. But since the timewarp mitigation is a serious candidate for a future mainnet softfork, it seems better to just deploy it on regtest.
The next commits add a test and fix the miner code.
The `MAX_TIMEWARP` constant is moved to `consensus.h` so both validation and miner code have access to it.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 59ff17e5af
fjahr:
ACK 59ff17e5af
glozow:
ACK 59ff17e5af
Tree-SHA512: 50af9fdcba9b0d5c57e1efd5feffd870bd11b5318f1f8b0aabf684657f2d33ab108d5f00b1475fe0d38e8e0badc97249ef8dda20c7f47fcc1698bc1008798830
Integer promotion will already turn the `signed` into `unsigned` in
those lines. However, make the `unsigned` explicit so that the code is
clearer and a compiler warning is avoided when switching to m_rng:
| test/validation_block_tests.cpp: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'const unsigned int' [-Wsign-compare]
| 136 | bool gen_invalid = m_rng.randrange(100) < invalid_rate;
| | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
| 137 | bool gen_fork = m_rng.randrange(100) < branch_rate;
| | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~
| 2 warnings generated.
rand_cache is unused since commit
16329224e7, so it can be removed
rand_seed is wrong since commit
022cf47dd7, because it is no longer
printing the seed that was used to seed the global random context in
tests. Instead, it prints a (random-ish) value derived from the global
random context via InsecureRand256().
Finally, the for loop creating new prevector_tester objects will always
use the same seed since commit fae43a97ca,
because repeated calls to SeedInsecureRand/SeedRandomForTest will always
reseed the global with the same "static const" seed.
Fix all issues by
* removing the unused rand_cache,
* removing the call to SeedRandomForTest which restored the same seed on
every call in the process, and
* Reseeding the global random context with the (random-ish) rand_seed.
fa899fb7aa fuzz: Speed up utxo_snapshot fuzz target (MarcoFalke)
fa386642b4 fuzz: Speed up utxo_snapshot by lazy re-init (MarcoFalke)
fa645c7a86 fuzz: Remove unused DataStream object (MarcoFalke)
fae8c73d9e test: Disallow fee_estimator construction in ChainTestingSetup (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Two commits to speed up unit and fuzz tests.
Can be tested by running the fuzz target and looking at the time it took, or by looking at the flamegraph. For example:
```
FUZZ=utxo_snapshot perf record -g --call-graph dwarf ./src/test/fuzz/fuzz -runs=100
hotspot ./perf.data
ACKs for top commit:
TheCharlatan:
Re-ACK fa899fb7aa
marcofleon:
Re ACK fa899fb7aa
brunoerg:
ACK fa899fb7aa
Tree-SHA512: d3a771bb12d7ef491eee61ca47325dd1cea5c20b6ad42554babf13ec98d03bef8e7786159d077e59cc7ab8112495037b0f6e55edae65b871c7cf1708687cf717
The flags SECP256K1_CONTEXT_{SIGN,VERIFY} have been deprecated since
libsecp256k1 version 0.2 (released in December 2022), with the
recommendation to use SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE instead.
This currently has no effect due to fPowNoRetargeting,
except for the getnetworkhashps when called with -1.
It will when the next commit enforces the timewarp attack mitigation on regtest.
16e95bda86 Move maximum timewarp attack threshold back to 600s from 7200s (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
In 6bfa26048d the testnet4 timewarp attack fix block time variation was increased from the Great Consensus Cleanup value of 600s to 7200s on the thesis that this allows miners to always create blocks with the current time. Sadly, doing so does allow for some nonzero inflation, even if not a huge amount.
While it could be that some hardware ignores the timestamp provided to it over Stratum and forces the block header timestamp to the current time, I'm not aware of any such hardware, and it would also likely suffer from random invalid blocks due to relying on NTP anyway, making its existence highly unlikely.
This leaves the only concern being pools, but most of those rely on work generated by Bitcoin Core (in one way or another, though when spy mining possibly not), and it seems likely that they will also not suffer any lost work. While its possible that a pool does generate invalid work due to spy mining or otherwise custom logic, it seems unlikely that a substantial portion of hashrate would do so, making the difference somewhat academic (any pool that screws this up will only do so once and the network would come out just fine).
Further, while we may end up deciding these assumptions were invalid and we should instead use 7200s, it seems prudent to try with the value we "want" on testnet4, giving us the ability to learn if the compatibility concerns are an issue before we go to mainnet.
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
tACK 16e95bda86
achow101:
ACK 16e95bda86
murchandamus:
crACK 16e95bda86
Tree-SHA512: ae46d03b728b6e23cb6ace64c9813bc01c01e38dd7f159cf0fab53b331ef84b3b811edab225453ccdfedb53b242f55b0efd69829782657490fe393d24dacbeb2
